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Resumen
Este artículo revisa los temas y trabajos presentados en la VII Conferencia Anual del Banco Central
de Chile sobre Mercado Laboral e Instituciones que pronto saldrán compilados en un libro en inglés
con ese nombre. En él se discuten los orígenes de las regulaciones laborales, las que no siempre están
asociadas a una falla de mercado específica. Además, se miden sus efectos en el mercado laboral, en
el crecimiento económico y en la desigualdad, efectos que dependen del tipo de regulación, del
contexto en que se aplica y cuán respetada es. Por último, se plantea cómo deberían diseñarse las
regulaciones laborales para generar los incentivos adecuados tanto en los trabajadores como en las
empresas. Los trabajos revisados son potencialmente muy útiles para el entendimiento de qué
regulaciones hacen falta, cuándo y cómo implementarlas.
Abstract
This paper reviews the issues and papers presented at the VII Annual Conference of the Central Bank
of Chile on Labor Market and Institutions, that will soon be compiled in a book by the same name. It
discusses the origins of labor regulations, which are many times not associated to specific market
failures.  It measures its effects on labor markets, growth and inequality. Effects that vary by type of
regulation, the context in which they are applied and the degree of enforcement. Finally, the paper
presents work how regulations should be designed in order to generate the appropriate incentives for
both firms and workers. The papers reviewed are potentially very useful in the understanding the type
of regulation that should be implemented, when and how.
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The importance of the labor market is indisputable. The countries’ economic
outcomes rely to a significant extent on its performance, as production,
economic growth, and prices are all intimately linked with it. Moreover, the
functioning of the labor market is a key determinant of social welfare.
Elements such as unemployment and its duration, job quality, wages and
compensations, greatly influence individual well being, and are in turn
greatly influenced by the performance of the labor market and its
institutions. Thus, labor markets and their response to shocks or changing
conditions, the functioning of labor institutions under different scenarios,
the ways in which they can be modified to improve their efficiency and the
endogeneity of sub-optimal institutional arrangements, are some of the very
significant issues that are analyzed in the collection of studies presented
at the VII Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile on Labor Markets
and Institutions and soon to be included in a book with the same name.
Surely, it will contribute to a better understanding of this market by
proposing new empirical evaluation approaches, and will enlighten the policy
discussion by suggesting ways to improve the design of labor regulations and
institutions.
Regulations and institutions govern labor markets all over the world.
Regulations are more stringent in some markets than in others, but labor
markets that are allowed to freely allocate resources with no intervention at
all are hard to find. Every day, firms must abide by a labor code when hiring
or firing people or when determining work loads, schedules, and other
conditions.
The pervasiveness of labor regulations has led people to question their
very existence and wonder what the world would be like without them. How
would macro- and microeconomic variables respond to shocks in the absence of
labor market regulations? Questions of this nature—together with issues
related to the specific effects of regulations on different outcome
variables, the optimal design of regulations, and the motivations behind
them—drive the authors of all the papers presented in the conference. The
recent theoretical and empirical research reported here contributes to a
better understanding of the functioning of labor markets and thus offers
important evidence for economic debates on themes as varied as growth,
inequality, poverty, unemployment, and human capital.
The field of labor economics can be simplified into two basic lines of
thought, which offer alternative explanations as to why regulations came to
life and how they managed to subsist in the modern world. Economists in the
first group, often called distortionists, believe that institutions are born
because of pressure from rent seekers—mostly employed workers who benefit
from the regulations they push, causing inequality—and that they produce
adverse economic effects by driving the market away from its supposedly
optimal laissez-faire position. Researchers adhering to this approach regard
regulations as the creators of distorted incentives that misguide economic
agents’ behavior, which results in inefficient resource allocation. The best
the society can do is to remove all regulations and let the market function
freely, because the best possible outcome will be achieved when each agent
looks out for its own benefit.
The second group, frequently called institutionalists, contends that
regulations originate as a response to market failures, which lead to
suboptimal outcomes. These economists claim that labor institutions pursue an
efficiency objective and not just a redistributive one. Properly designed and
implemented regulations are believed to play a role in moving the market
toward a better equilibrium that Pareto–dominates the laissez-faire position.2
Contrary to the distortionist view, institutionalists assume that it is not
always desirable to remove existing regulations. Deregulatory movements may
be fully justifiable in many circumstances, however, including changes in the
nature of the market failure or in the way agents and institutions interact.
It is not difficult to think of problems associated with the labor market
that could be an impediment to its efficient behavior. The typical arguments
used to justify intervention on efficiency grounds are that markets are
incomplete and imperfect, cause external effects, and have some
characteristics of a public good. All of these failures are easily found in
most labor markets, at some point in time. One case of market incompleteness,
for example, occurs when private insurers are unable to fully insure the
labor income of risk-averse workers. Unemployed workers are then incapable of
smoothing consumption, and they suffer a significant welfare loss as a
result. Worker allocation among jobs is suboptimal in this case, as workers
tend to stay in stressful jobs or accept an offer that is not their best
match, just to avoid the income loss during the transition or the
uncertainties of an employment change. Employers’ behavior may also be
affected, in that they will probably fire too often if they do not consider
the cost imposed on the redundant worker. This inefficiently functioning
laissez-faire market will trigger the design of institutions to improve its
behavior. Common regulations and institutions for addressing this specific
failure are unemployment insurance, severance payments, job banks, and search
agencies.
The classic example of market imperfection is that of a labor market
consisting of only one employer that behaves monopsonistically when hiring
its employees. This would be the case, for instance, of a one-firm town. This
unregulated market generates a wage and a number of hired workers that are
both lower than they would have been had a benevolent social planner solved
the equilibrium. Consequently, regulations like minimum wages are introduced
as a means of forcing the monopsonist to behave in a competitive manner.
Finally, conditions at the workplace, such as comfort and security, are
examples of nonrival and nonexcludable goods, and they can therefore be
classified as public goods. Workers are inclined to free ride on the effort
of others to attain better conditions, thus obtaining less than is socially
optimal given the total value assigned to them. Worker organizations, such as
unions, serve a purpose in this specific case, too.
All these regulations that are intended to solve a specific market
distortion and ultimately help people often end up doing neither. Generous
unemployment benefits may provide a good safety net for those who lose their
jobs, but they also imply costs in the form of higher taxes or lower wages to
finance the system and distorted search incentives for the unemployed. High
severance payments discourage firms not only from firing, but also from
hiring workers. High minimum wages in a non-monopsonistic market improve the
welfare of some workers, but they lower overall employment and raise
unemployment among the young and unskilled.
Thus, although the regulatory framework can bring about benefits, success
is not guaranteed. Many elements play a role in determining their final
outcome, including the type and severity of the market failure, the design
and implementation of the specific regulation, the degree of compliance, and
interaction with agents and other regulations. Even when a regulation is
correctly designed for the distortion in the market at a given time and then
effectively implemented, changing conditions may render that regulation
useless or even counterproductive at a later time, and it may not apply at
all under different circumstances or in a different country. It is therefore
essential to design adaptable regulations that can change with evolving
conditions.3
Regulations are not bad per se and need not be abolished altogether. Some
should be eliminated, however, as they do not serve their purpose, either
because they were badly designed or implemented or because conditions have
changed, making the regulations unfruitful or even perverse. A modern view of
the regulatory role thus combines both the institutionalist and distortionist
perspectives. It starts from the premise that many labor markets today ache
from market failures of varying degrees and natures that inhibit them from
functioning well without proper regulation. It recognizes that many of these
regulations are badly designed and require major makeovers or even
elimination, as they hurt more than they help. Moreover, the selection of
specific regulations and their design should be closely tailored to the
precise problem observed in the market, since one size does not fit all.
This proposition raises several questions. How did the labor market
regulations currently in place come into being? What are the effects of
today’s regulations? What should optimal labor regulations look like? The
papers compiled in the book represent steps forward in answering these
questions. We address them one at a time below.
1. THE ORIGINS OF CURRENT LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS
Interventions are justified on efficiency grounds when they respond to some
market failure that inhibits the market from arriving at a competitive
equilibrium. Thus, if we expect the regulations to be driven by concerns for
efficiency, we should expect their design to follow a careful study of the
market, its flaws, and options for solving them. This is typically not the
case. More often than not, regulations are promoted by interest groups, whose
influence depends on a country’s social and political structure.
1 Similarly,
well-intentioned policymakers frequently dictate rules to help specific
groups of people, only to end up hurting them or others.
The stylized model presented by Giuseppe Bertola (2005) highlights
additional mechanisms that motivate collective interventions aimed at
altering laissez-faire wage and employment outcomes. These are tested both in
a competitive labor market and in a market that fails to achieve its optimum
because of mobility costs and limited access to financial markets. The key
insight is that workers do not hold a proportion of all production factors as
the representative agent. Consequently, workers maximize a welfare function,
which leads to a situation that departs from the competitive market outcome.
In this case, the portion of total production that does not accrue to them in
the form of wages is ignored. Therefore, workers may push for a reduction in
employment, since it has a negligible negative effect at the point at which
the wage equals nonemployment opportunities, but a first-order beneficial
effect on the still-employed workers’ welfare.
So, regulations are not necessarily implemented to maximize production,
employment, or welfare. They often obey specific interests and may result in
outcomes that are even worse than those produced by the imperfect market in
the first place. Implementing them is not free of cost; it requires
substantial information acquisition and interpretation. Monitoring is not
cheap, either. As Bertola points out, countries will therefore create
different kinds of regulations to confront the same market distortion, in
order to best accommodate their information processing, monitoring, and
enforcement capacities. Moreover, the same regulations will have different
effects depending on the characteristics of the economy in which they are
applied.
                        
1. See Saint-Paul (2000).4
2. THE EFFECTS OF TODAY’S LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS
Independently of the motivation behind regulations, most of the relevant
literature tries to estimate their effect on specific variables of interest,
such as measures of aggregate and disaggregate labor market outcome or
macroeconomic variables and trends. Not surprisingly, the estimated effects
of different regulations, in different countries at different times, are
varied. Common sense indicates that changing circumstances make each
country’s regulations more or less suitable to pursue their objectives.
Bertola presents simple descriptive analyses for countries in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in Latin
America that show that the effects of given regulations do vary in a changing
world.
2 For instance, the cross-country evidence has established that the same
institutions were associated with very different outcomes in the 1960s and
1980s. In general, the evidence presented by Bertola for OECD countries shows
that job security provisions are detrimental to job creation. High layoff
costs reduce both hiring and firing, thereby lowering turnover and, with it,
employment volatility. The economic literature is not conclusive regarding
the overall effect on average employment, since it depends on the specifics
of each economy.
Nevertheless, cross-country comparisons do not say much about the effects
of regulations because such effects are regularly endogenous. As Agell (2002)
puts it, we do not know “what comes first, the chicken or the egg.” Most
unemployment protection regulations are present in high-unemployment
countries—as a consequence, but also as a cause of the unemployment (see
Bertola, 2005). This endogeneity complicates cross-country comparisons
because the real effects of the regulatory framework must be disentangled
from the structural features that led to them.
Additional problems arise in such comparisons because the effects of
regulations vary with other variables normally excluded from the analysis,
such as the type of market failure, the intensity and nature of shocks that
hit the economies, and the initial conditions of the market. This last
variable is shown to be important by Juan J. Dolado, Marcel Jansen, and Juan
F. Jimeno (2005), who model state-contingent effects of partial reforms on
various labor market outcomes based on a search equilibrium model. What they
find corroborates the intuitive idea that the effects will vary according to
the circumstances and market conditions.
For instance, a reduction in layoff costs targeted to less productive
workers in sclerotic labor markets may reduce low-skilled workers’
unemployment without affecting the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers,
and it may increase the wage and welfare of both categories. In tight labor
markets, however, such a policy often increases unemployment among low-
productivity workers and has little effect on the unemployment rate of high-
productivity workers. The welfare of low-productivity workers typically
falls, while the welfare of the more productive ones increases. Obviously,
the policy is much less politically feasible in this second scenario than in
the first.
According to Heckman and Pagés (2004) the aforementioned problems—
endogeneity and variation in effects depending on initial conditions—explain
why the evidence for the OECD is not conclusive on the effects of
regulations. They claim that research on Latin American countries should be
                        
2.  Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) arrive at similar
conclusions.5
more fruitful in that endogeneity is less of an issue, since most reforms
followed big political regime changes and thus were mostly exogenous. Their
findings are open to controversy, however. This, Bertola says, is due to the
low quality of the data on Latin American labor markets, which resemble the
data available for the OECD fifteen years ago. Another serious problem
involves defining how to measure the regulatory framework. Should one use an
aggregate index of regulations, or some degree of disaggregation? How should
one capture the fact that the same regulation is more stringent in one
country than in other? For example, an accurate analysis must consider not
only the existence of minimum wages, but also their level and enforcement.
Finally, one must capture both the aggregate effect of a regulation and its
distribution among workers.
Claudio Montenegro and Carmen Pagés (2005) address the issue of the
distributive impact of labor regulation. They use the large variation in
labor market regulations experienced in Chile since the 1960s to analyze the
impact of the regulations on the distribution of employment across age,
gender, and skill level. They consider the effects of the total costs of
dismissing workers, including advance notice, severance payments for each
tenure level, and the probability that a firm’s economic difficulties serve
as justification for termination. They also consider the effects of the
minimum wage on employment distribution. Their detailed analysis confirms
that young, low-skilled workers and women are the most hurt, although an
increase in the minimum wage seems to benefit women.
Nevertheless, it is not only the aggregate and distributional effects of
regulation that matter, but the way they may interact with other variables is
also a concern to many policymakers. Pierre-Richard Agénor (2005) makes an
appealing point in describing—analytically and empirically—the potential
tradeoff between institutional changes oriented at alleviating poverty and
those intended to reduce unemployment, such as payroll tax cuts for unskilled
labor and reductions in minimum wages or severance costs.
The papers by César Calderón and Alberto Chong and by César Calderón,
Alberto Chong and Rodrigo Valdés (2005) further contribute, in a number of
ways, to the literature on the effects of the regulatory framework of the
labor market. First, they focus on two macroeconomic variables that
accurately signal the total effect of regulations: growth and inequality. If
a regulation’s aim is to correct an inefficiently achieved equilibrium in an
imperfect labor market, it should enhance efficiency and thus produce a
growth effect. If the regulation has a distributive rationale, then it should
result in changes in overall inequality. Moreover, these two variables not
only capture the initial motivation for the regulation, but also reflect its
aggregate effects quite concisely.
A second important contribution is the way the authors treat regulations.
They incorporate two measures—one that reveals the amount of regulation
(their de jure or “thickness-of-the-code-book” measure) and one that reflects
the stringency of the regulation and the degree to which it is enforced
(their de facto measure). Additionally, regulations are not added up; rather,
each is introduced individually, as they may and will have different effects
on the outcome variables. They find that some regulations deter growth (for
example, minimum wages and trade unions), but not all of them produce a
significant negative effect. Moreover, the effects are extremely small,
requiring drastic regulatory changes to produce a modest increase in growth.
The authors also find that inequality is negatively affected by some
regulations, specifically by minimum wages. Other labor regulations, such as
unionization, maternal leave, and government employment plans, seem to
improve income distribution.
The conclusions of these two papers are intuitively appealing, in that de
facto regulation dominates de jure legislation when explaining labor market6
outcomes. Also, adding regulations up in a single index conceals information,
because the effects of each legislative statute vary. Finally, in most cases,
the effects found are very small.
Another alternative to the traditional approach of assessing directly
policy measures is to analyze quantitatively the actual performance of the
market. For that purpose, they could either use micro or macroeconomic data
to build indicators to look whether the market is farther from its
competitive equilibrium than markets in other countries or to compare the
behavior of the market returning to the equilibrium after being disturbed.
Gilles Saint-Paul (2005) builds indicators of wage rents, as proxy for
labor market competition, to evaluate the impact of recent labor reforms in
European countries. On analyzing the evolution of within-industry wage
differentials and welfare differences between employed and unemployed
workers, he finds that contrary to popular belief, most European countries
are neither more nor less competitive than in earlier periods.
A technique designed to determine the relative flexibility of labor markets
is chosen and applied, using macroeconomic data from a sample of OECD and
emerging markets, in Elías Albagli, Pablo García and Jorge Restrepo (2005)
and, using plant-level data from five Latin American countries, in Ricardo
Caballero, Eduardo Engel and Alejandro Micco (2005).
When evaluating flexibility, these two papers introduce alternatives to the
traditional approach of directly measuring labor regulation (typically de
jure regulation) in the style of the work done at the OECD and Heckman and
Pagés (2004). Instead, they measure labor market flexibility by the way the
market is functioning. Albagli, García, and Restrepo do so at the
macroeconomic level, while Caballero, Engel, and Micco focus on microeconomic
plant-level data.
Measuring de facto rigidity in labor markets requires first distinguishing
its source. What is perceived as labor market rigidity in the raw data may
actually be the economy’s response to a sequence of negative shocks over a
given period of time. In addition, the response of macroeconomic variables
will be different in the presence of labor market rigidity. For instance, the
more rigid the labor market is, the longer unemployment will last. What is
called for is identifying and disentangling the set of structural shocks
driving the economy, which can be done by estimating a structural vector
autoregression (SVAR). Albagli, García, and Restrepo use this econometric
technique to identify four structural shocks, based on an open economy model,
with a supply side and wage bargaining à la Blanchard and Summers (1986).
They use this methodology to compute a direct measure of labor market
rigidity—namely, unemployment persistence—for a heterogeneous sample of
countries.
3 They assess each country’s performance by its responses to
identified structural shocks.
This paper’s contribution over previous work on this line of research is,
first, to extend the model to small open economies; this is a natural way of
proceeding, since many of the countries in the authors’ sample are small and
open. Second, their index is comparable across emerging and OECD economies.
Their index of the half-life of unemployment—after the economy is hit by a
shock—depends exclusively on the rigidity coefficient in the wage-bargaining
equation of the model. In contrast, some of the rigidity indices found in the
related literature depend not only on this rigidity parameter, but also on
other structural parameters. This does not represent a serious problem if the
economies being ranked are similar, but it can lead to misinterpretation of
results when the sample includes countries with heterogeneous levels of
development and openness. The authors find that Chile, Hong Kong, Korea, and
                        
3. Balmaseda, Dolado, and López-Salido (2000), Dolado and Jimeno (1997), and Fabiani and
Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2001) are examples of the same approach for closed economies.7
the United States rank among the most flexible labor markets, while Colombia,
Germany, Spain, and Sweden stand among the most rigid.
Caballero, Engel, and Micco, in turn, follow a different approach to
assessing labor market flexibility. Based on earlier work by Caballero and
Engel (1993) and Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997), they measure and
compare microeconomic flexibility by estimating the speed at which
establishments close the gap between labor productivity and the marginal cost
of labor.
4 Their methodology is derived from an adjustment hazard model in
which a change in the employee headcount at any plant is a probabilistic
function of the gap between desired and actual employment. The model allows
for nonlinearities (lumpy adjustments) and state-dependent responses. This
strategy had never before been applied to Latin American countries.
The authors estimate that Brazil, Chile, and Colombia are more flexible
than Mexico and Venezuela. A detailed analysis of the Chilean case identifies
signs of a downward trend in microeconomic flexibility after the 1998 crisis.
This conclusion points in the same direction as Heckman and Pagés (2004).
3. OPTIMAL LABOR REGULATIONS
Labor regulations and institutions undoubtedly affect the dynamics of
important variables of the labor market. The impact varies depending on
circumstances and design. Any perverse effect of a regulation does not
necessarily imply that no regulation is needed, but rather that the specific
regulation has not been designed or implemented efficiently to address a
specific market failure at a specific point in time. In this sense, we lack
analysis on what optimal regulations should look like.
Identifying the market failure and its effects is first and foremost, in
order to evaluate alternative regulations and defined policies that best
solve the defined problem. The regulation’s implementation and design depend
crucially on the market conditions under which it will be applied. The
ongoing research of Blanchard and Tirole (2003) in optimal labor market
institution design is probably one of the most recent efforts of modern
economics in this field. It is particularly relevant because it presents a
concrete analysis of a specific market failure, its effects, and the detailed
design of regulations that solve the problem. It also recognizes how other
institutions and interactions between agents and the market modify the way in
which the regulation should be designed.
Based on that joint research, Olivier Blanchard proposes a system in which
unemployment insurance and employment protection, in the form of layoff
taxes, coexist, and in which their specific design is molded by complications
that may arise from the interaction in the market between firms and workers.
The identified failure is the workers’ limited access to financial markets.
Thus, he works through a detailed design of unemployment insurance intended
to diminish the negative utility effect on dismissed workers and to make
firms internalize layoff costs, trying to have the appropriate incentives to
avoid misbehavior. Therefore, he examines the effects of labor regulations on
hiring, firing, and job search decisions in markets where workers are not
fully insured against changes in income.
Blanchard considers elements such as how the insurance amount, periodicity,
and administration affect firms’ firing and hiring decisions and workers’ job
search and acceptance decisions. He also introduces ex post wage bargaining
power and worker heterogeneity into the analysis to build concrete proposals
on how the design should adjust to them. For example, he proposes limiting
                        
4. Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997) reproduce the aggregate dynamics of the U.S.
labor market using data from a large set of individual firms.8
payments if the fact that workers can collect income while unemployed
diminishes search incentives. While one size does not fit all, certain
elements of markets can be analyzed and translated into specifically designed
regulations that work efficiently to solve an identified market failure. The
paper works through several of them, but in the end each country’s authority
must consider all the possible complications and interactions to arrive at an
optimal regulatory design.
In the specific case presented by Blanchard, the problem arises from the
inability to insure workers’ income in bad states of nature, such as
unemployment spells, during which income drops drastically and unexpectedly.
Consequently, the probability of falling into a bad state is a crucial
element for the design of the optimal regulation. When this probability is
high, the usefulness and necessity of unemployment protection increases from
the workers’ perspective. This happens, in particular, when markets are not
complete and risks are not covered, meaning that consumption cannot be
insulated from income shocks.
5 It is therefore critical to study the evolution
of workers’ income during their life cycle. Cristóbal Huneeus and Andrea
Repetto (2005) make a remarkable empirical contribution to the knowledge of
the earnings process for the specific case of Chile. They find that, as in
other countries, adverse income shocks as a result of unemployment spells are
more likely to occur as workers become older, but they are less likely to
happen at all in Chile than in the United States. Their empirical analysis
also confirms that government transfers in Chile have little effect on
consumers’ ability to compensate persistent shifts in their earnings. They
show that the Chilean distribution of income is highly persistent, which is
explained by the underlying variability of the earnings process. One
conclusion is that it is much harder for Chilean than U.S. consumers to
smooth consumption and move to a higher income quintile. As Huneeus and
Repetto put it, the welfare consequences of income uncertainty are high in a
developing economy, where the public welfare system is small and consumers
cannot share risks or are liquidity constrained. These findings should be
taken into account in the design of regulations in Chile and in the analysis
of cross-country differences in institutional arrangements.
Another element that interacts with labor market imperfections and
regulations and should be considered when assessing and designing labor
market policies is the long–run trend in the demand for skilled workers. In
Chile, as in other emerging economies, the demand for skills has grown more
than proportionally, in association with international trade, as confirmed by
Olga Fuentes and Simon Gilchrist (2005).
6 Fuentes and Gilchrist’s analysis
covers the period between 1979 and 1995. The authors disaggregate their data
by trade orientation: export-oriented, import-competing, or nontradable
sectors. They then examine labor composition and wage premiums between
skilled and unskilled workers and also estimate the relative demand for
skilled workers. Their results suggest the existence of skill-biased
technological change. This long, deep process is related to characteristics
of the production function that, in the presence of labor market
imperfections, could affect income distribution and heighten the
vulnerability of low-skilled workers.
                        
5. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) show that even in a developed economy like the United States,
income risks related to unemployment are not pooled, so families’ consumption is not perfectly
insured. Smoothing consumption could also be in the interest of entrepreneurs, since it could
contribute to smoothing business cycles.
6. Previous work on the subject reports increasing relative demand for skilled workers, which
translates into increased returns for education and rising wage dispersion. Studies of developing
economies include Meza (1999) and Cragg and Epelbaum (1994) for Mexico; Robbins (1999) and
Attanansio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2003) for Colombia; and Robbins (1994) and Pavcnik (2002) for
Chile.9
4. SOME FINAL REMARKS
The papers reviewed are useful in several ways. They explain theoretically
why existing labor regulations, though not optimal, were originally put in
place. The major conclusion is that market failures are at the heart of labor
regulations. Given the existence of those failures, some of the papers
suggest appropriate regulations for handling them (for instance, layoff taxes
and unemployment insurance), together with their optimal or efficient design
in order to generate the appropriate incentives for both firms and workers.
Other papers focus on how initial conditions affect the final outcome, how
different outcome variables and types of workers are affected, and how each
type of regulation may have a different effect on the same outcome variable
when applied in a different context, time, or place.
Not all regulations are properly designed to achieve the most efficient
outcome given the specific market conditions and type of failure to be
addressed. Many regulations are not intended to improve efficiency, and those
that are often do so ineffectively, either because the regulations are not
implemented correctly or because they were designed without an adequate
analysis of market interactions. For example, several design failures are
identified in the specific case of unemployment protection regulation. The
final outcome of any regulation thus depends on many factors, including
initial conditions, as evidenced by the modeling of state-contingent effects
of partial reforms.
The book also provides a wide-ranging empirical analysis of labor markets
and their regulatory framework. The effects of regulations are not easily
accounted for. Data problems and endogeneity are just some of the obstacles
to obtaining a robust estimate of the effects. Furthermore, the importance of
enforcement versus legislation is highlighted, as is considering each
regulation independently, as individual regulations have varying effects on
different outcome variables, such as growth and inequality. In addition,
regulations also have an impact on the composition of unemployed workers with
regard to skill level, age and gender.
Given the difficulties of measuring the impact of specific regulations,
several papers of the book offer alternative methods for assessing the degree
of labor market flexibility by looking directly at the adjustment processes.
Two papers provide a cross-section view of the adjustment process at the
macro- and microeconomic level, respectively, while another presents a time-
series analysis of the recent evolution of competitiveness in European
countries.
Designing better regulations, particularly unemployment insurance, requires
detailed knowledge of the earnings dynamics of the respective country. In the
case of Chile, the empirical work done on this issue helps determine how much
workers would be willing to give up to stabilize their income. It is also
confirmed that the demand for skills in Chile has grown more than
proportionally in association with international trade, similarly to what has
been reported in other emerging economies. This long–run trend interacts with
labor market imperfections and should be taken into account when assessing
and designing labor market policies and regulations.
Finally, the very relevant issues that are analyzed in the collection of
studies reviewed here will definitely contribute to the understanding of the
labor market, and will enlighten the discussion with new suggestions of ways
to assess it empirically, and proposals to design better labor regulations
and institutions.10
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